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The past 15 months have seen the beginning of  labor force. Even so, tile authors observe non-
structural change in Ruissia  but a failure of the  trivial outflows from unemployment to jobs, and
economy to stabilize. The balance sheet, con-  In some regions to jobs In the private or collec-
clude Commander, Liberman, and Yemtsov,  tive sector.
suggests that a return to centralized control
remains almost Impossible, but the decentraliza-  In Russia, outflovs to state sector jobs
tion that has occurred contains many undesirable  dominate. Survey evilence  shows considerable
features.  turnover in the state sector and resilient hiring.
Much of the churning in labor markets seems to
In framing their analysis, the authors draw  be through voluntary separations and job transi-
on aggregate data and flrm-level data from the  tions. Net changes to employment have been
first-round results of a 1992 survey covering 41  limited, and have involved mostly ancillaxy or
firms in the Moscow region. The survey results  clerical staff.
suggest that tt.;  greater autonomy of firms has
facilitated the exploitation of market power  Commander, Liberman, and Yemtsov
while failing to dampen the demand for easy  discern a core or membership rule dominating
credit from the budget or banking system. For  Russian firms' decisions, whicn it would be
the most part, that demand has been satisfled,  dangerovs to assume will be maintained. They
enabling firms to meet current wage claims and,  interpret it as a holding strategy in a complex
to a lesser degree, sustain output levels.  game the firms have been playing with govern-
ment. Lack of a credible reform program has
Buoyant nominal profits can be traced either  weakened any impulse toward large-scale
to pricing behavior derived from market power  restructuring of firms.
or to transfers or subsidies channeled through the
fiscal or monetary system. This In turn has  Wages have been more volatile and have
artificially sustained the revenue side of the  greater regional dispersion, but the authors
government accounts.  predict no large consistent shift in relative
wages. Rather, the wage path has probably been
Official unemployment was no more than 1  governed by current revenue streams and addi-
percent of the labor force by the end of 1992, but  tional transfers, and then set consistent with the
evidence on the importance of marginal unem-  stable employment rule. The path of wages over
ployment indicates that the underlying pass-  1992 is clearly associated with changes in
through into open unemployment will be great.  Russia's monetary and fiscal stance and allied
By the third quarter of 1992, this "augmented"  institutional features.
unemployment rate approached 4 percent of the
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Introduction
The attempt in early  1992 to  stabilize the Russian economy was set  around a  reasonably
comprehensive  price liberalization  accompanied  by tight money  and fiscal restraint with announced  goals
for changes in property rights.  The macroeconomic  component  fell rapidly to pieces by the second half
of the year.  Fiscal and quasi-fiscal  deficits expanded to between 35/40% of GDP over the year and
significant  money financing resulted predictably  in high and rising inflation. Consumer price inflation
exceeded 1500% for the year with 25+ % monthly increases over last quarter of 1992 and the first
quarter of 199%.
There are clear signs of structural change, however muted and dispersed. The expansion  in the
private service sector appears particularly striking, if  largely unmeasured and regionally diverse.
Privatization,  de facto and de jure, has been initiated  and open unemployment  has emerged. But by early
1993 no more than 2% of the labour force was classified as unemployed  and considerable  ambiguities
remain regarding rights to title and control. Not least, the political context remains largely antithetical
to any orderly reform.
This paper concentrates  on the interaction of macroeconomic  and structural changes with key
labour market variables. Due to coverage and other data issues, we devote a good amount of attention
to laying out the evolution of these variables prior to embarking on some preliminary analysis of the
findings. Our starting  point is a brief examination  of the macroeconomic  environment  and developments
on the real side of the economy. We concentrate  on the dominant state sector and hence largely i  nore
the non-trivial changes in title and growth of new private entities that has been occurring.  Clearly we
risk downplaying  the creative part of the current employment  process.  Our discussion of -wage  and
employment  shifts is both aggregative, using regional and branch data, but also draws heavily on firm
or establishment level information.  In particular, we work with the first round results of a survey
undertaken in the Moscow Region in November 1992  and covering  41 firms 2.  The results are used to
get a better handle on firm-level  decisions  and constraints, including  the path of financial variables over
1991 and 1992.
We then turn to unemployment  and the characteristics  of the unemployment  so far generated. In
Section 7 we try to interpret the effects of these changes  on wage and employment  behaviour. We note
that, if appropriately specified, wage behaviour appears to be weakly related to local labour market
2  ful discussion  of the  sampling  procedure  and results  can  be found  in Commander  et al (1993b)Russia  -2
conditions.  We conclude  by emphasizing  the dominance  of a stable employment  target in fini  decisions
over the last fifteen months.  We suggest that perhaps the dominant objective of Russian firms has
generally been to restrain the rate of job separations. It seems likely that current revenue streams and
credits have been channelled  to wages where firms have suffered significant  negative shocks and that
wages have been set to be consistent with short run employment  stability. One implication  is that the
current employment  overhang  is indeed very large.
1.1: Macroeconomic Environment
At the heart of the stabilization  was the liberaPization  of producer  and consumer  prices. The jump
in the price level of January 1992  was enormous;  producer  prices rose by 382% and consumer  prices by
245  % over the pr-vious month. It was followed  initially  by high but declining  montWy  inflation,  albeit
with fair variance  in regional  changes  and considerable  instability. But, as Fig. 1 indicates,  producer  and
retail price cbanges  accelerated  rapidly in the second  half of 1992  and early 1993  when monthly  inflation
rates exceeded  25%.  This acceleration  and the corresponding  instability  of relative  prices can be traced
to a number of factors.  First, despite the size of the initial  price jump in January 1992, only a partial
liberalization of prices had occurred.  Subsequent  measures of price decontrol have still left a large
residue of domestic prices partially liberalized,  hence there has been the expectation of future price
increases; second, the behaviour of price setters in the economy and the structure of  competition
prevailing in particular markets and third, the fiscal and monetary stance was greatly relaxed. The
associated fall in the exchange rate was non-neutral  with respect to inflation as currency substitution
eroded the monetary  base and hence the inflation  tax (see Fig.4).
Several features of the Russian inflation  should be emphasized. First, there has been very high
dispersion in retail price changes across regions (see Table 1).  While the measured monthly variance
declines over 1992, the range has remained  very larpy mcd  volatile, as indicated  by the upward drift in
ti,  coefficient  of variation for the last quarter of 1992. Among other facts, this points to the presence
of continuing differences in the degree of price liberalization  across the  c  conomy and the pervasive
p'esence of localized price controls.  De facto centralized controls over energy prices, agricultural
products, transportation  charges  and certain other items have also been maintained.
The mesh of liberalized  and regulated prices has, not surprisingly, resulted in a confusing and
volatile price structure. The striking  divergence  in the rate of increase  of consumer  and producer prices
that Figure 1 indicates  requires  explanation. One reason may be of statistical  coverage. Producer prices
have been collected by branch from a very small number of the largest firms.  This sample may not beVIC.  I  _  3  _
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representative and most probably overstates  producer price increases.  Even so, this data on producer
prices would carry information  on Lie pricing  decision rule of larger firms; firms which we may assume
are likely to have significant market power.  Cjur survey evidence likewise suggests that firms with
market power have largely  adjusted on the price side  3.  This was facilitated by  the associated
accumnulation  of interenterprise  arrears.  In the expectation  of insurance  through the Central BarAk,  firms
ratcheted  up prices irrespe^tive of underlying  shifts in demand. This may explain why change£  to non-
energy intermediates drove the inflation in producer prices in early 1992. By contrast, fina! goods'
relative prices fall sharply in early 1992 with some recovery later in the year as household income
rebounded.  Finally, we should liote the importance  of later and continuing adjustments to regulated
energy prices and the likely pass-through  to producer prices
1.2: Anchors to the Stabilization
The stabilization  wa&  to be anchored  primarily by money with incomes as a secondary anchor.
There was no attempt to fix and use the exchange  rate.
A tight monetary policy was announced  with the implication  that open-ended  credits to firms would not
be sustained.  The Central Bank refinance  rate was raised to 20% and subsequently  to 80% by mid-year;
lending  rates to the firm sector reached 100/120%  per annum  in 1992.3Q. This implied  strongly negative
real interest rates throughout the year.
Initially, policy  and institutional  constraints  combined  to generate  a restrictive  monetary and fiscal
stnce.  The fiscal deficit was held at around 5% of GDP at mid-year.  Real broad money decl-ned  by
70% and credit to the economy by over 60% between end-91 and end 92Q1 (see Figs.2 & 3) '.  Cash
shortages, leading to wage and payments  arrears, combined  with the large cut in real household  incomes,
to dampen domestic demand.
The response of the firm sector to a relatively restrictive  monetary stance and uncertainty  over
the sustainability  of the announced  fiscal stance  was, in common  with earlier episodes in Central and East
Europe, a rapid expansion in inter-enterprise  arrears.  These  jumped from around 39 million rubles in
January to 3.1 billion at end-June.  While in a highly concentrated  productive structure, such as that of
Russia, arrears can quickly be transmitted  through the system as a function of the behaviour of larger
3 See C.Commander  et al (1993b)
4 Note  that  the  end-December  1991  figure  is a rather  confusing  base  and  overstates  the subsequent  cut  to money
and credit.Nominal
Iflation  Raus  Ut.DOy  Cw  Wages  Ran"  aa  Wages  e
(%  C!aPgs)  Maz  Kin  (a  Clang)  Max  Kin  st.Drv  CT  (ion  92=100)
1992
fEBRUARr  24.5  51.9  1.1  12.2  0.10  39.4  5653  799  968.9  0.42  111.9  0.14
EuIn3  21.1  53.5  4.1  10.5 0.09  36.0  7496  1066  1232.2  0.48  125.7  0.16
azrLo  15.3  S.7  2.S  8.5  0.07  12.0  10585  1218  1563.0  0.45  122.1  0.18
Am  11.1  36.1  4.0  5.8  0.05  20.4  12558  1479 i1C7.0  0.51  132.3  0.21
JUNE  13.1  25.0  5.7  4.4  0.04  37.8  14824  2124  2362.9  0.51  16X.2  0.21
JoUr  7.2  18.6  0.5  3.4  0.03  7.7  15202  2307  2565.1  0.47  161.9  0.22
AhYSF  7.2  17.2  1.9  2.5  0.02  7.7  16254  2425 2713.3  0.46  162.8  0.25
SZAFTMNDR  11.0  18.1  2.0  3.j  0.03  25.6  21065  3155  3297.9  0.45  184.2  0.25
OC2OBR  22.9  42.0  9.0  6.2  0.05  20.0  27253  3372  4104.4  0.48  179.9  0.28
nOVAeBBR 26.1  47.0  9.0  6.5  0.05  19.5  28371  3728  4696.0  0.46  170.4  0.27Russia  -8-
entities, there is some evidence  that accumulation  of arrears was a de facto concerted  bargaining  strategy
for firms with respect to govermnent. This strategy also facilitated  the satisfaction  of current priority
claims on revenues, primarily wages.
In the third quarter of 1992 there was a clear shift in policy, led by the stance of the Central
Bank. Real credit to the economy  nearly doubled  over the previous  quarter 5.  Directed  credit to sectors
of the economy and to the banking system expanded enormously. The distinction  be'tween  fiscal and
monetary  policy largely coilapsed. Preliminary  estimates  of th.: fiscal deficit for 1992 were 11  % but the
measure is inappropriate.  Central Bank credits to  firms supported a higher-than-warranted  path of
nominal  profits and hence of revenues. Further, the fiscal stimulus  was far larger as directed  credits and
unbudgeted  import  subsidies  likely amounted  to a further 25  + % of GDP. Monetary  policy accomodated
the fiscal stimulus in so far as it was not overtly expansionary  itself.
The dr.ving mechanism  behind  the movement  in fiscal  and monietary  aggregates  has been the firm
sector. But while  arrears accumulation  in the first half of 1992  was the most obvious  symptom  of firms'
claims on government,  the reaccumulation  of inter-enterprise  arrears at the end of 1992  and ovur the first
quarter of 1993  is less easily  explained,  given  the largely accomodating  response  of both government  and
Central Bank to these financing claims 6,  Arrears are unlikely to be a simple measure of incipient
financial distress or an efficient sorting of losers and winners.  With the widespread introduction  of
prepayment for contracts in mid-1992, . ams  have continued to  try and  capture a  combination of
inflationary gains through payments withholding and/or attach a  high probability to  further debt
cancellation  through the actions of the Central Bank.
The unsurprising  result of the fiscal  and monetary  stance, and the allied  political  uncertainty,  was
not only accelerating  inflation  but increased financial  disintermediation  and currency substitution. It is
striking to note that domestic  foreign exchange  deposits  jumped to over 40% of broad money by early
1993 (see Fig.4) 7.  The flight from domestic  money  characteristically  reduced  the monetary  base, hence
cutting into the yield from the inflation  tax.  While the monetary base has remained large relative to
5 There  are also some  seasonal  factors  at work  here.
6  3 Arrears  of industrial  firms  -- a series  of not comparable  with the figures  reported  in the  text for the first
half  of 1992  -- may have  moved  from  around  1.9  billion  rubles  in September  1992  to over 3 bn by March  1993;
but the figures  are very uncertain.
7  This excludes  mattress  money,  the volume  of which  is not trivial.Rwsia  9 -
GDP, given the unsophisticated  nature of the financial  system, and hence facilitated  a still high inflation
tex in 1992 8, very negative interest rates and institutional  restraints on liquidity have accelerated not
only currency substitution  but also a shift into currency.
The collapse in the exchange  rate has been driven by the adverse expectations  of agents and the
switch out of the domestic currency. This has compounded  the volatility attributable  to a thin market.
Despite continuing  quantitative  restraints  on external trade, a super-competitive  exchange  rate has partly
stimulated  exports, primarily  as a channel for capital flight 9.  In some cases, the export drive is likely
to have exacerbated  domestic  goods market imbalances,  further forcing up the price level.
The inability  to anchor the stabilization  through money was compounded  by the extremely  weak
second anchor, wages.  Wage controls were set on the wage bill of finms and capped in terms of an
aggegate  norm not exceeding  four times the minimum  wage. But given the infrequent  and erratic shifts
to the minimum  wage, the result  was that in most months - as indicated  by Fig.6 - actual wages for All-
Russia  very significantly  exceeded  warranted  wages  under the wage  tax rule. While  this partially showed
up  in  increased profit tax payments by frins,  and hence contributed to  the relative buoyancy of
government revenues, the wage tax rule could not be construed  as a binding  constraint on firms.
As of the first quarter of 1993, the shift to full but lagged indexation  has not occurred in any
widespread  sense, though there are signs that wage setters now explicitly  target consumer  price changes
and, in parts of the private sector, set dollarized  wages. Nevertheless,  the decision  at end-1992 to index
pensions  provides an important  and more  general precedent  for example  to wage bargainers. In a context
of extreme price volatility  and disturbances  to relative prices, a shift to widespread  indexation  and hence
of endogeneity  of the adjustment  interval,  would make the economy  even more vulnerable  to shocks and
hence to a non-linear acceleration  in inflation.
2: Output and Inventory Changes
Output fell by around 20% in 1992  and this deceleration  likely  continued  through  the first quarter
of 1993. Although  we observe fairly high synchronisation  in the output  decline  across industrial  branches
and sectors, we observe no precipitous fall concentra:ed  into one quarter, as for example occurred in
Poland in the first quarter of 1990. Industry  output universally  declined  over branches in 1992  but with
s One provisional  estimate  is that  the inflation  tax  was  as high  as 7% of GDP,  already  half  the level  of 1991.
9 Provisional  figures  indicate  that  capital  flight  in 1992  was  over US$12  billion.TABLE 2  : nDUSTRY  AND BRANCH NDICES
1992/1991
All  Energy  Fuels  Iron&St  NFerMet  Chem  Machine  Timber  Constr  Light  Food Output  81.4  93.1  90.0  82.4  87.8  80.1  83.1  83.5  81.1  68.7  76.6 Employment  96.5  109.7  88.6  102.2  102.8  99.7  92.8  95.8  97.0  96.8  98.9 Product wages  24.1  31.2  19.7  24.0  14.1  20.5  29.0  38.8  34.6  49.1  29.3 Consumer wages  60.1  75.3  90.8  76.1  78.6  67.0  51.2  65.1  55.0  48.6  61.2 Producer prices  4126.3  3990.9 7596.7  5231.9  9227.7  5409.2  2915.0  2766.5  2629.0  1632.5  3449.5 Relative prices  100.0  96.6  186.2  127.5  226.7  131.9  69.9  66.2  62.8  38.1  83.2
4  Q 1992  /  1  Q 1991
All  Energy  Fuels  Iron&St  NFerMet  Chem  Machine  Timber  Constr  Light  Food Output  71.1  88.2  84.5  70.5  81.6  65.4  72.4  57.4  70.4  53.6  75.2 Employment  95.3  124.2  114.1  102.5  114.6  103.5  88.1  88.8  96.0  95.0  98.9 Product wages  23.4  41.3  l5.8  33.4  15.3  26.2  33.6  24.8  43.3  36.7  27.6 Consumer wage.  57.5  73.0  65.6  74.2  79.5  67.9  45.3  29.2  51.5  40.4  108.2 Producer prices  12368.0  8911.6  20966.3  11183.9  26120.6  13059.8  6784.9  5934.1  5985.1  5542.9  19729.8 Relative prices  100.0  71.8  170.1  90.4  212.1  105.6  54.5  47.6  47.9  44.4  160.0
I-
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some dispersion. The heaviest output losses have been concentrated  in light industry and in parts of the
capital goods complex, with the bulk of other branches registering decreases of between 16-20% (see
Table 2).  This follows on from significant  output losses in 1991 implying very substantial  contraction
over levels obtaining  at the end of the 1980s.  Nevertheless,surveyevidencesuggestsconsiderableintra-
branch heterogeneity  in the output path.  Our survey in November  1992, for example, found that 58%
of firms had experienced  a clear decline in output over 1992 with an unweighted  mean projected fall of
20/25% over the year.  But 15% of firms reported output expansions  and the remaining 27% constant
output levels.  Even within engineering and light industry - branches with the largest quantitative
contractions  - the picture was quite mixed  '°.
The sharpest falls over the previous year occurred in the third quarter of 1992 (see Fig.7).  This
may partly be a seasonal phenomenon or reflect adjustment  lags but is hard to reconcile with the
information,  presented above, regarding the monetary and fiscal stance.  Indeed, we observe a large
relaxation in the credit constraint in the third quarter.  However, we also observe a generalized shift to
prepayments  and contract  binding  that may have constrained  liquidity  in parts of the firm sector  and hence
compromised  current output levels.
2.1: Aggregate Factors
The impulses to  output decline have been various and difficult to attribute.  They include
aggregate  shocks  channelled  through changes  in macroeconomic  policy and credit market effects, in part
linked  to inefficiencies  in the system arising from the separation  of household  and firm accounts. On the
supply side, we have two obvious  possible channels. The first comes from disruptions  to intra-CIS  and
CMEA trade, possibly with quantitative  shortfalls leading to output constrained  by inputs availability.
Our survey evidence  suggests  that this has been a non-trivial  factor in restraining current capacity. The
second can be traced to relative  energy prices. Such a relative  price effect would likely impart a conunon
upward shift in firms' production  costs and have aggregate  effects if there was low dispersion in the ex
ante ratio of energy to total costs across firms.  We observe a sharp upward adjustnent to energy prices
mid-year and this is likely to have been a factor inducing further slowdown  in the the third quarter.
An obviously key candidate is household  demand, given the buoyancy  of government spending,
channelled  through the fall in household incomes  and wealth associated  with the price liberalization. It
is  indeed striking that real wages fell very  substantially in January 1992 (see Section 5), as  did
10 See Commander  et al (1993b)  for  detailsRusgia  - 12  -
households' real balances. The fall in measured  real wages was further exaggerated  by the structure of,
and inefficiencies  in, the financial  system provoking widespread  liquidity  squeezes  and accumulation  of
wage arrears by firms.  Thus, a certain share of nominal wage claims over the first half of 1992 were
not satisfied due to currency shortages. In addition, industry-level  data indicate  a significant  build-up  in
finished  goods inventory that would be consistent  with a negative  demand shock to firms. In 1992, as
Table 3 indicates, raw materials inventory in industry increased  less sharply than for goods-in-process
and  finished items.  The latter expanded strongly with adjustments to the  valuation of  inventory
accounting  for a share of the change.  Aside from the type of shock the path of inventory  suggests, it
likely indicates  that inventory accumulation  has been one pattern of response  by Russian firms.
But simply  emphasizing  the fall in household  demand for firm sector goods is problematic. In
the first place, given ex ante shortages, the initial  price jump will have  overestimated  the decrease in real
purchasing  power. Further, real wages  recovered  fairly strongly  through  the year after the dip of the first
month.  Retail sales indeed fell dramatically at the outset of 1992 (see Fig.5) but rebounded quite
powerfilly in the second part of the year. In addition,  the official  data likely understate  very significantly
the value of retail sales, given the important innovations  in trade that occurred through the year ".
Moreover, in the context of high anticipated  inflation,  households  evidently  drew down real household
money balances provoking a relatively buoyant demand for goods and assets over the second half of
1992.
2.2: Sectoral Factors
Shocks of a more reallocative nature should a priori be traced to changes in relative prices
generating differential sectoral outcomes with respect to real variables.  In addition we would expect
changes  in the composition  of govermnent  expenditure  to be significant. A fall in investment  would  show
up in lower demand for capital goods and we would also expect falling demand for military goods.
Evidence  on military production is hard to gather but provisional  estimates indicate  that military output
fell by 40% and the share of military sector output in total outrut declined  by over 11  % in the first nine
months of 1992  '.
A starting point is obviously to see whether we can observe output and relative price changes
"These include,  for example,  the proliferation  of private  shops  and booths.
12 Centre  for Economic  Aralysis  and  Forecasting  (1993)Fig  7
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moving together.  Given the closed nature of the economy, it is not surpriaing  to h 1 d no association
between  output changes  and a summary  competitiveness  measure, such as short-run shadow  branch profit
rates  3.  At first inspection, branch  series indicate  an increased  dispersion  in the changes  over 1992 with
considerable  monthly  volatility. Preliminary  regressions  relating  the change in branch output relative to
industrial sector output with the change in branch relative prices, gives a clear and reasonably robust
association  in the changes  over the majority  of branches. The association  is weakest  for energy, building
materials and  food branches but particularly tight for machine-building  and light industry, where
household  demand shocks  and falling investment  expenditures  have presumably  motivated  the downward
shift in their relative prices. The scatter (Fig.8) likewise  indicates  that relative output and relative price
changes have been positively correlated, providing some limited evidence in favour of a  structural
component  to the distribution  of output losses. We should  note, however, that this has not been  translated
into changes  to employment;  a point dealt with in more detail in Section  4 below.
3: Finandal  Performance In the FYrm  Sector
Given what we now know about output and arrears in the firm sector, we might have expected
a sharp deterioration in financial performance  across branches.  This is probably an underlying reality
but the reallocation  of resources through the budget and directed credits has subsequently  shown up in
higher than projected revenues. Higher flows  to firms have supported  higher nominal  profits and hence
higher tax revenues, in part through the profit tax.  But the general picture is likely to be diverse and,
given  the large disturbances  to the price level and turbulence  in relative  prices, we would expect volatility
in firm profits and a higher measure of randomness in their distribution  over branches. This is indeed
the picture that emerged from the first year of the Polish stabilization  '4.
In the abserne of branch level information  on the profile of profits, we have to rely on the survey
results with the information  covering 1991 and the first three quarters of 1992.  This has the further
advantage  that we are able to classify  firms crudely in terms of their market status.  Thus, 60% of firms
were  classed as monopolists or olig6polists, here defined as  between 2-5 producers. Competitive
conditions only dominated  in light industry  and in the trade firms.
We observe fair persistence in both sales revenues  and gross profits at branch level over early
'3  Short  run shadow  profit  rates  with  capital  and labour  priced  at zero  are  given  in Senik-Leygonie  and  Hughes
(1992).
14 See Pinto  et al (1992a)Russia  - 18-
1991 levels, even if there is greater intra-quarter  variation in 1992.  For firms classified by market
power, it is striking to observe the divergent movements  in real revenues  and profits for competitive  as
against firms with market power.  Competitive firms suffer an unambiguous  negative shock to gross
nrofits and sales over 1992. Although  there is considerable  dispersion in the level of profits at the firm
level.  Thus, at first inspection  we find no evidence  of a generalized  sales and profits slump among the
sample. There is one exception  - the largely  budget-financed  science  sector firms whose revenues  indeed
turn strongly negative  in real terms, particularly in the first half of 1992  when the explicit stance of the
government  was to reduce budgetary  flows  to firms.  But the bulk of the discussion  below centres on the
industrial and trade firms in the survey.
In principle, the net profit position  of firms ought to provide some indication  of retained  profits
and hence of the implicit trade-off  between current allocations  and the longer  term viability  of the firm.
This is more complicated  in the Russian  context as the allocation  rule governing  the distribution  of gross
profits has been qualitatively  different than in a market-based  system.
The net profit position  of firms reflects  the distribution  of gross profits over the respective  funds,
profit tax and interest payments. In general, firms are expected  to assign all gross profits but can hold
back a certain share. In 1992  the dispersion  in net profits was considerably  greater than for gross profits.
Indeed, over a quarter of the sample registered  negative  net profits in at least two of the three reported
quarters of  1992.  However, almost all these firms reported negative profits through 1991 which
obviously weakens the argument that negative profit shocks were loaded into 1992.  Further, given
uncertamty over rules regarding investment  allocations,  profit tax rates and self-financing  requirements
as well as strongly negative real interest rates, it is not surprising to find firms assigning more than
current gross profits. This can reflect a drawing down  of financial  reserves or commitments  which firms
seek to cover ultimately  through financing  by the banking  system.
For 32 firms where we have information  on both changes in output volume and changes in real
profits we are able to break this down in terms  of market attributes,  classifying  in terms of monopolists,
few producers and competitive firms.  Figs. 9-10 provide scatters relating output and gross profit
changes.  For firms with market power it is clear that negative shocks to output have mostly been
associated with positive changes in gross profits.  This does not hold for competitive  firms.  The firm
level information thus seems consistent with the path of the more aggregated producer price series
available for branches at a Russian level.  The implication  is that we are continuing to observe the
behaviour of de facto price setters able to control directly  gross value added.Russia  - 19-
Finally, we can  also note the general stability  of the shares accounted  for by the respective funds
in the allocation of gross profits  In particular, it is striking to note the resilience of investment and
technical development  fund allocations.  While we cannot satisfactorily capture the end-use of fund
expenditures,  we do not observe any notable shifting  off resources  towards bonus payments  or the social
fund, where the translation  into current wages would be easier.
4.1: Changes In Employment In 1991 and 1992
Several features  of the former Soviet  system are important  in understanding  recent developments.
They include  ex ante high labour  force participation,  high concentration  in employment,  as in output, and
a heavy weight to industrial in total employment. Trade and services accounted  for no more than 12%
of total employment  in 1985. In addition, the skill profile and its bias toward manual labour reflected the
stock of technology and the extensive growth strategy of earlier periods.  While unemployment waq
minimal,  job turnover, particularly  at the base of the skill structure, was fairly high, running in the range
of 15% per annum in industry in the late 1980s.
Job losses precede the 1992 reforms.  For industry, aggregate  employment  in 1991 was ilready
down nearly 8% over the peak in 1986 and this trend holds for the major branches, save construcdon.
This is generally related to the enterprise reform law and the wage and employment setting regime
allowed under that reform.  Greater decentralization  of wage bargaining combined with an explicit tax
on wages gave incentives  for employment  reductions  and motvated higher tumover through changes in
relative wages across firms.
Aggregate data provide some insights into employment  changes over 1991 and 1592 and are
striking in showing  relatively little employment  loss, given the size of shocks to output.  This holds for
both the state sector as whole and for industry. Total state sector employment  fell by around 3 % in both
1991 and  1992.  Over the full period, GDP fell by around 30%.  For industry, the decline is also
relatively  smaller; employment  being  down under 4% in the first reference  period. In 1992  net  job losses
decelerated and total industrial employment  fell by under 2% 15. Around 85% of gross job losses were
accounted for by changes in the machine-building  branch and, indeed, several branches registered net
increases to employment  over the year (see Table 2).
Fig. I1 provides a scatter for output  and employment  changes over the major industrial branches
for the period January 1991 to November 1992.  It shows quite clearly that branches with the largest
Partime work  feil  by 516% in idustry  over 1992.TABLE  3a
Employment  flexibility,  some indicators  for  August,1992,Russia  by regions
Ratio  of  Ratio  Ratio  Unemploym  Ratio  Ratio  of
personnel  of  of  Margi-  Rate:  of  Total
in  employees  nal  Empl. Jobseek/  Marginal  Marginal
involunt.  with  (col.1+2) Labour  Employ..  Employ.
leaves  reduced  to  Force  to  +Unempl.
to  hours  Employment  Labour  (Broad)
industr.  or  week  in  Force  to
employm.  to  Industry  Labour
ind.  empl.  Force
REGIONS  1  2  3  4  5  6
RUSSIA  3.96%  3.86%  7.81%  1.39%  2.36%  3.75%
North  3.20%  2.69%  5.88%  2.04%  1.86%  3.91%
North  West  5.41%  6.04%  11.45%  1.58%  3.25%  4.83%
Center  4.86%  4.30%  9.16%  1.46%  2.79%  4.25%
Volgo-Viat.  7.10%  9.33%  16.43%  1.37%  6.28%  7.64%
Centr.-Chernoz.  6.29%  5.15%  11.44%  1.43%  3.36%  4.80%
Povolzhsk.  2.36%  2.90%  5.26%  1.19%  1.68%  2.87%
North  Caucas.  5.19%  3.99%  9.18%  1.33%  2.16%  3.50% Ural  4.55%  3.12%  7.66%  1.07%  2.83%  3.90%
West Siberia  3.53%  5.97%  9.49%  1.48%  2.62%  4.10%
East  Siberia  3.28%  1.00%  4.28%  1.20%  1.18%  2.38%
Far East  1.65%  0.96%  2.62%  1.03%  0.60%  1.63%
Kaliningrad  0.55%  0.38%  0.94%  2.48%  0%  2.74%
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output losses  have adjusted  employment  most but with huge asymmetry  in the changes. The relationship
is not systemat?c  and perhaps more striking is the general increase in employment  over the majority of
branches despite significant  output losses.
But this story is somewhat  misleading. While it is true th4t formal  separations  and net job losses
have remained  small in both the state sector as a whole and in industry, large numbers of workers since
mid-1992  have been placed on short time work and involuntary  leave. This strategy would be consistent
with inducing active  job search behaviour or secondary  employment  by de facto reductions  in primary
employment. In many contexts,  this appears  equivalent  to providing  dole within  the firm, as labour costs
are pared back to minimum  wage levels or below.
Unfortunately, we lack good time-series that would enable us to get some measure of the
employment overhang embodied in short time and involuntary leaves. A Goskomstat firm survey in
October 1992  indicated  that as much as 25% of all firms have placed some fraction of their labour force
on unpaid leave or short time working and that this share had doubled since June 1992. While we lack
time-series information  on this phenomenon  we have a very detailed breakdown for August 1992. As
Table 3a indicates,  for the industrial  sector roughly  8% of the current workforce  was on involuntary  leave
or short time work.  In nearly 40% of oblasts over 10% of the industrial  labour force were marginally
employed. This shares rises to over 20% in regions, such as the North West, where military  production
has been concentrated 16.  Quite obviously, the dominant  response of firms has been to place workers
in marginal employment  without formal separation. In crude terms, this may be taken as a measure of
the employment  overhang.  Releasing  the marginally  employed into unemployment  in 1992.Q3 would
have raised the unemployment  rate by 275%.
In summary, while net  job losses have remained  small and with limited  regional dispersion, this
probably  disguises the parallel phenomenon  of labour  hoarding  through short time work and involuntary
leave.  In addition, significant  numbers of workers have been placed on minimum  wages, signalling  the
intention  of firms to shed those jobs without  denying transitional  insurance.
4.2 Private Sector
If the story on the state-side of the employment  picture is of gradual  job destruction, alongside
16 Take  the example  of Novosibirsk  oblast  where  we know  that military  employment  exceeded  40% of total
employment  pre-  1991;  employment  losses  have  been  trivial  but marginal  employment  amounted  to 25  %  of industrial
employment.Russia  - - 22  -
a rather high degree of churning - with workers moving  at quite high rates between  firms - the picture
with respect to the private and cooperative sectors - the sectors ir. which we might expect some job
creation --  is less evident.  Thus is partly because of conf-.ion arising from the very widespread
reclassification  of title that has been occuring in both years "'.  In the  case  of cooperatives,  official
survey data show a 40% decline in employment  between January and July 1992, while private firms'
employment  increased by over 10%.  Even so, this would imply that combined employment  in these
categories  in mid-1992  comprised no more than 3% of total employment. Further, the relatively high
share of secondary  workers -- 16% as against  the economy-wide  average of 3.5% - suggests  that many
of these firms may be small, part-time operations. It seems that official data capture very inexactly  the
path of private sector employment  and likely grossly underestimate.
One indication  of the degree to which  private  job growth is underestimated  is provided  by the data
on the direction and number of job finds of those leaving unemployment.  Although only 16% of job
finds at the Russia level are in collective or private  inms, we can see very wide dispersion over the
regions with 25/30% levels being reported in several regions (Appendix I able 1). Fig. 12 relates that
share to net job finds.  Of interest is the apparent inverse association  of private sector finds with net  job
finds; indicating  the obvious discrepancy  in the respective  growth and destruction rates for jobs 18,
4.2: Employment Changes: Firm Level Data
Questions  of coverage  and data reliability  make firm level data attractive  as a countercheck. We
can explore employment  decisions in more detail using our survey results.  This yields some striking
results that can be summarized  as follows; (i) high rates of turnover,  especially  among skilled and semi-
skilled workers, (ii) very low levels of involuntary  separations  across all fuim  size classes and branches,
(iii) considerable  new hiring by fims,  largely to replace separating  workers and, consequently,  (iv), a
generally  fairly low level of net job losses  through 1992.
For the firms in our survey it is notable that while nearly thrde-quarters  of the sample reported
net employment  losses for the third quarter of 1992, over 25% actually posted net employment  gains.
17 The ILO survey in June reports 27% of establishments  classed  as leasehold,  55% state and 18% private but
the distinction  is not,  it appears, very meaningful  in terms of economic  behaviour.  The state sector may be
shrinking fast (down 8% over their sample between  Sepotember  1991  and June 1992)  but primarily by means of
title changes.
Is These figures originate from the registers in Employment  Offices and clearly underestimate  both job finds
and layoffs.Russia  - 23
Table 3: Russia: Inventory in Industry by Type; 1991.4 - 1992.3
End period nominal stocks  Change through IVA
(Change)
Type  91.4  92.1  92.2  92.3  92.3/91.4  91.1  91.2  91.3
Raw Materials  326  495  938  1511  4.6  50  429  476
Goods-in-Process  55  167  273  480  8.7  72  169  125
Finished  32  170  319  583  18.2  -22  149  138
Merchandise  7  22  50  110  15.7  8  14  15
Other  9  38  107  200  22.2  2  13  45
Total  429  892  1687  2884  6.7  111  776  799
Source: Russian Goskomstat [IVA= Inventory Value Adjustment]
Table 4:  Employment Changes over 1992, 3rd Quarter
Separation, Hiring and Vacancy Rates (%  of labour force)
Firm Size
1  2  3  4  5
Separations  10.5  10.0  9.5  5.7  7.8
Hires  7.2  3.7  4.8  2.5  9.9
Net Separations  3.7  7.0  5.2  3.3  -2.2
Expected Separ-
ations in 92.4  2.4  2.4  2.3  0.5  0.5
Vacancies  1.5  3.1  1.0  2.2  1.9
Posted Vacancy  0.1  1.0  0.7  0.9  1.1
Sourcet World Bank Survey
Table 5:  Job Separations by Type
(%  of total separations)
Firm Size
1  2  3  4  5
Quits  62.2  52.3  52.9  43.4  52.7
Disciplinary  8.5  3.2  3.4  7.7  4.7
Employment
Reduction  10.4  31.3  10.7  37.1  3.1
Other  19.9  13.2  33.0  11.8  39.5
Source: World Bank SurveyRussia  - 24  -
Further, in one quarter alone nearly 3 % of the labour force experienced  some labour market transition.
The main results are condensed  in Table 4.
Several points emerge. First, for 1992.3  total separations  amounted to around 8/10% across the
firm size classes and the separation  rate was fairly evenly  distributed. Second, net job losses  were much
smaller, amounting to no more than 5  % for the total sample. The dispersion is fairly low but in general
net  job losses are more concentrated  among  smaller firms. indeed, the largest firms actually  experienced
net increases to their work-forces.  Expected  job  losses over theX  fo'i;th quarter that are reported are
similarly low and inversely associated  with firm size.
Table 5 also pins down the principal characteristics  of the separations process.  The dominance
of quits is striking and over 50% of all separations  can be classed as voluntary.  Explicit  job reduction
decisions display considerable  variance and amounted  to around 17% of gross job losses for the full
sample. Total involuntary separations  comprised  less than a quarter of reported total separations. The
weight of  quits  in  total separations reinforces the view that the  Russian labour market remains
characterized  by rather high turnover  at local level, if not across regions where institutional,  housing and
other constraints tend to be more binding.
The persistence  in hires raises some interesting  questions. Relating  output  changes  to employment
changes in the sample is instructive. As with the aggregate  data, most striking is the absence of a clear
and predictable relationship  between output and employment  movements.  Indeed, for the 25 % of the
sample that reported positive net hires in 1992.3, nearly 70% projected output losses over 1992  with an
unweighted  mean decline of 15%.  There is significant  dispersion  over branches and firm size class.s
with respect to employment  changes but there is clear asymmetry with regard to the size of shocks to
output.  For the outermost observations where output losses ranged between 35-50%, employment
contraction averaged no  more than  15%.  Figs. 13-14 put together the direction of output and
employment  changes for the survey firms.  The scatters  again classify in terms of market power and are
mainly remarkable for showing no predictable relationship  between  output and employment  changes for
either types of firm.  The clear conclusion  that can be drawn, bearing in mind the limitations  of the one
quarter recall period, is that employment  adjustments  have occurred  and there are signs of rapid tumover
within  localized labour  markets. But the adjustments  have  uneven  and restricted  given  the size of changes
to output.  At first approximation,  we may assume that labour  productivity  has declined.
The survey results reinforce  the conclusion  gathered  from more aggregate  data sources regarding
the continuing  high rates of turnover, very low levels of involuntary  separations, significant hiring andRussia  - 25  -
a generally low level of net job losses in Russia through 1992.  However, several factors repay more
attention.  First, the high level of quits and hires for workers - in both cases the proportions are
significantly  above the share of workers in the firms' labour force.  Second, there is the dominance  of
production workers, rather than unskilled workers, in these quits.  It seems likely that this process has
been promoted by emerging competition  for workers and by the persistence of apparent shortages for
skilled or production workers. The recent liberalization  of the wage setting and wage structure  - while
quite evidently  highly incomplete  (see Section 5) - appears likely to have promoted local job turnover
as production  workers chase  relative wage adjustments. This obviously  begs the question  of why labour
demand for such workers remains so relatively buoyant. The answer seems mainly to found in fixed
factors or  technology.  What we know about work organization in Russian industrial plants also
emphasizes  the strong and somewhat  mechanical  association  of plant to labour.
Involuntary  labour  shedding  has consequently  been  concentrated  on non-production  workers  and,
in particular, women.  We know from the unemployment  data that women comprise over 70% of the
unemployed at the start of  1993.  We also know that this share has not been shifted by the growing
weight of layoffs in total inflows to unemployment  in 1992.  The clear implication  is that production
workers  have remained  largely untouched  by unemployment  and by the process of involuntary  separation.
Firms have, wherever  possible, dispensed  with ancillary  workers, largely concentrated  in administrative
work and in many cases female labour.  However, even here the job losses in industrial enterprises
remained very limited by the end of 1992.  The bulk of job losses have been concentrated in the state
budget  or non-material  sector, not in industry. This also explains  the high weight of female and clerical
workers in total unemployment.
4.3: Labour Hoarding
The relatively gentle decline in employment  relative  to output in industry is striking  particularly
given the widespread acknowledgement  of extensive and continuing labour hoarding.  The marginal
employment  measure already alluded to gives some indication  of the general scope of the phenomenon.
Further, nearly two-thirds  of sampled  firms reported  excess  employment  levels in 1992.3. This was fairly
equally distributed across firm size class and branch and, with the exception  of the largest firms where
the estimate  *.as  below 1%, was put at between 8-14% of current employment.
At first glance, one might expect institutional  factors goveming  dismissals  and/or union presenceRussia  -26
to impede  involuntary  separations  "9. But  this appears  generally  not to be true. Unions  are present  in
most workformcs  but carry negligible  bargaining  power  so that in only 10% of cases where excess
employment  was  present  werc dismissal  les  and  worker  protest  cited  as factors  of any  significance  in
governing  employment  decisions.  By contrast,  in nearly  two-thirds  of those  cases  the motive  for labour
hoarding  was  the  belief  that  output  would  shordy  expand,  warranting  crrent retention  of excess  workers.
In 25  % of cases,  the argument  given  was  that  such  workers  were  not  a significant  financial  burden  to the
firm.
The latter  response  can also  be related  to the presence  of minimum  wage  workers  within  firms.
Average  industrial  wages  exceeded  minimum  wages  by a factor of between  5-12 times over 1992.
Evidence  from  the survey  suggests  that  some  firms  - particularly  in macinery  and  light  branches  - have
begun  to place  parts  of ther labour  force  on or around  minimum  wages  with  minimal  work  requirements.
Minimu  wages  were reported  for nearly  5% of the sample  workforce  and in several  cases  was in the
range  of 20/25%% T'.h amountss  to de facto  provision  of unemployment  benefit  within  the firm, with,
of course,  the difference  that workers  still have  access  to some  firm-provided  benefits. Assuming  the
ough distribution  of wages  in total labour  costs from the firm-side  and constant  access to non-wage
benefits,  resort  to minimum  wages  would  have  allowed  firms  to make  per capita  labour  cost savings  of
at least 45% over 1992. Taking  benefits  - primarily  housing  - as a short run fixed cost, wage
reductions  to the minmum wage  level would  be equivalent  to or, in some  cases, less than outright
severance  costs  25.
5.1: Wages  In 1991  and 1992
Initial  conditions  with respect  to wages  can be summarized  as follows. Wage  levels  were  low
with non-monetary  components  being  a  ubstti  part of personal  income  12.  And low wage  levels
have  cond  through  1992  and 1993,  as Fig.  16 makes  clear. The ratio of average  industrial  wages
19  Firing decisions  were take  by the adminsaton  alone in 60% of cases, by the administration  in association
with the trade union in 15% of ces  and by the factory council in the remaining 15%.  Opposition  to dismissals
arose from the trade unions in half the sampl,  but significantly  no opposition  was reported in a third of cases.
20 13% for engieein  firms; 9% for light indury.
21 Note also that a minimum  wag  'dole' would have been roughly equivalent  to average benefits payments
through 1992.
2  Non-monetary  beneffis cunly  amount to 35/40% of labour costs and take a wide variety of forms,
including  housing. See Commander  et al (1993b)  for a fuller discussion  of these issues; also World Bank (1993).Fig  16
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to a minimum subsistence  basket has generally not exceeded  4,  with minimum wages and pensions
consistently  below that absolute  poverty indicator  2.  Wage dispersion was very limited, even including
bonus payments used to motivate workers.  The wage structure betrayed a bias toward production
workers with low or negative  returns to skills accumulation. The Enterprise  Reform Law of 1988 had,
in principle, allowed  for greater decentralization  of wage and employment  decisions  and weaker  restraints
on changes to the wage level and structure 4.  In general, the main result was relative wage and
employment  stability alongside higher across-the-board  nominal claims.  Loss of control over nominal
wages was clearly an important  component  driving  the acceleration  in inflation  over 1991.
With regard to the wage level, we have the obvious problem in measurement across scarcity
regimes, complicated  in 1992  by the additional  problem  of cash shortages  and liquidity  constraints. Both
drive a wedge between notional and actual claims making identification  of the real-real wage almost
impossible.  Further, the presence of secondary  work - in 1991 this was measured at 3.5g  of total
employment  in the state sector - and its likely expansion  omits components  of aggregate  wage income.
In addition, the evidence of short time work and unpaid vacations forced on workers by firms would
result in reduced de facto nominal wage payments. Despite  these important  caveats, the aggregate data
carry information  both with respect  to the direction  of change and the structure of relative wages.
At first glance, official  wage data show statistical  real claims accelerating  in 1991. At the peak
in December 1991, statistical real wages were roughly 50% higher than in January 1991 and double the
level of January 1988  when the Law on Enterprise  Reform was enacted. The climb in statistical  wages
is followed  by a precipitous fali over the first quarter of 1992. The January price jump alone engineered
a 55% decline over December 1991  (see Fig.17).  This decrease is common  across indusurial  branches.
The decline is yet larger - around 75% - when measuring average industry sector product wages.
Thereafter, we observe some pick-up in wage claims, particularly in the second half of 1992. By early
1993  average industrial  wages were converging  back to early 1991 levels. This is consistent  with survey
evidence regarding wages.
We can supplement  the discussion  of branch level wage developments  by looking  in some more
detail at the evolution of regional  wages.  This has merits for several reasons. First, the data appear to
2 The construction  of the minimum  consumption  basket  is discussed  in more  detail  in World  Bank  (1993).
24 See  Oxenstiema  (1990)  for a description  of the Law  and its implications.Russia  3
be more reliable.  Second, for real wage calcuiations  we need factor in the non-trivial differences in
regional price levels to which we have already alluded.  The dispersion in regional changes, though
declining  over much  of the year, remained  significant. While we do observe broad convergence  over the
year in the annual rates of regional retail inflations, this disguises  strong monthly fluctuations.
Nominal wages disaggregated  by region are striking for the high variance across region as
indicated by the coefficient  of variation.  While we observe no trend over 1992 we do find a major
increase in variance when compared with 1991.  Deflating by regional retail prices, we observe
considerable dispersion and instability.  The coefficient of variation indeed increases significantly
throughout  1992. Differences  in the path of regional  real wages have  to be related  not only to disparities
in regional inflations  but to divergent nominal  wage claims.
Using  the retait  price deflators  we report regional  real wage indicators  for the first eleven months
of 1992 in Table 6.  Basing to January, we observe an average real wage expansion  of between
60/70% 25. The expansion  in real claims  is common  to all regions but with significant  variance  and wide
monthly  movements.  The overall  picture is of some resurgence  in wages and a restoration  of wage levels
of early 1991.
Evidence from our survey provides some interesting,  complementary  evidence  for the path and
structure of wages over the period 1991.3 - 1992.3. Table 7 provides  the raw information  categorizing
in terms of firm size.  Several features are notable.  First, the predictably low dispersion in the wage
levels across firm size class and the bias in the wage structure toward  skilled workers. Nominal  changes
across the period show a generally high degree of convergence, though with clearly stronger wage
increases reported in the larger firms and for higher level staff, in particular.  Real statistical wages
indicate  a fall of between  35-45  % for most workers, with, however, much lower decline for all workers
in larger establishments.
5.2: Relative  Wages
With respect to  relative wages, there is some upward drift in  the standard deviation and
coefficient of variation across sectors and some initial evidence of that continuing in 1992.  But the
overall impression  looking  at relative  sectoral wages  over 1991/92  is of little change, indicating  the power
of  institutional features in the wage setting that have tended to dominate the redistributive effects
I  Note  that we are using  regional  retail  price  deflators  not the consumer  price  deflator  used  for the aggregate
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Table  6  Russia - Regional  indices  for  Wages,  Pricea  and  Uployuent-Mo@eeber  1992
(Jau92-100)
Nominal  Retail
Region  Industry  Price  Total  UnepI@yue'at-----
Wage  Index  Rmployment  Brad  Warrow
North  642  447  98  200  363
NW  678  441  93  292  556
Centre  684  424  96  231  622
V-Viatsky  776  376  98  305  1782.
C.Chernozem 764  421  103  193  920
Povolzhak  805  380  99  170  1061
N.Caucasus  591  415  101  202  698
Urals  756  484  98  187  1520
W.Siberia  726  462  90  205  1406
E.Siberia  553  415  99  160  768
Far East  643  554  92  185  810
Kaliningrad 681  361  96  268  450
RUSSIA  696  432  98  209  751
Table 7:  Wage Levels, 1991.39 - 1992.39:  Moscow Region
Dy  Firm  Sims  and  Type  of  Uuployses  Monthly  Wages  (roubles)  1991  and  1992  f'!ird
Quarters
Firm  Sis-  (employmot)
1  2  3  4  S
91.3  92.3  91.3  92.3  91.3  92.3  91.3  92.3  91.3  92.3
VYce-
Director  826  8192  1175  10583 1209  13581 1186  13766 1058  16896
ITR  803  6773  904  5559  791  7952  796  8001  546  6533
Professional
Skilled  903  8070  808  6927  877  9410  738  8566  681  9151
Workers
Unskilled  539  5897  524  4600  400  3591  275  3354  299  4207
Workers
Firm  Size  Categories:  1-  80-350;  2.  351-700;  3=  701-9005 4=  901-1500; 5- >1501
employees
Source:  World  Bank  Survey
Table 8s Real Statistical Wage Xndes;  by Firm  Sise and Typ  of  Work; (19  91.3-100)
Firm Size
1  2  3  4  5
Vice-
Director  64  58  72  75  103
ITR  54  40  65  65  77
Professional
Skilled  58  55  69  75  87
Workers
Unskilled  70  57  58  79  91
Workers
Sources World Bank surveyRussia  - 32
transmitted  through high and unstable inflation. This is confirmed by our firm survey which indicates
that in 60% of the sample there was no change  or a decline in wage differentials. Table 8 indicates  the
rather close convergence  in rates of change  across the main grades, so that by 1992.3 relative  wages had
shifted surprisingly little.  This can probably be attributed to the fact that in over 80% of cases wages
remained administratively  set, rather than bargained.  We do however find a clear widening in wage
differentials  at the top of the wage structure. This suggests  that the compression  imposed  by the previous
tariff wage structure is at least beginning to come apart, even if the process has remained somewhat
muted.
There is, however, some fragmentary  evidence  that wage differentials  have widened in favour
of groups of organized  groups.  Miners and energy sector workers  initially expanded  their ex ante wage
differentials both with respect to  industry in general as also with respect to skilled or professional
workers. It is indicative  of the perversity  of the Russian  wage structure that while miners and university
lecturers' wages were roughly comparable  in 1989  by May 1992  the former received  average  wages over
six times that of the latter.  This gap may have narrowed and has certainly fluctuated widely in the
presence of lagged contract  renegotiation,  but by the third quarter of 1992  was still around a multiple  of
four 26.
An emerging correlation between output and/or employment  losses and wages is indicated by
analysis of regional wage movements and relativities.  Relative wages of regions with the highest
observed  job losses, such as the North-West  and Central Regions, decline in 1992. Fig. 19 provides a
scatter relating  output changes  to changes  in the consumption  real wage for the major industrial  branches.
Again, we find some clear indication  that higher downward  adjustments  to wages have been associated
with lower real wage claims.  Firm level information  likewise  suggests that wages have tended to be
systematically  lower in firms with the highest output and employment  contraction '.  This may signal
the appearance  of a weak, emerging  association  of wage behaviour  and levels of employment  in regional
labour markets.  Given very  limited mobility of labour, local labour market variables, such as
unemployment,  could be expected to be the incipiently targetted  variable. This is a point to which we
return in more detail later.
26Econoincheskaja  gazeta,  May 1992  and Delovoy  Mir, October  1992
27  See Standing  (1992)Russia  33
6: Unemployment
Although the changes  to measured  unemployment  have  been significant  in absolute numbers, they
have started from a very low base. As already mentioned  at end-1992  total jobseekers  amounted  to around
1.8% of the labour force 28. Different shocks have their counterparts in the type of unemployment
generated.  In principle, some comnponent  of changes in employment  can be attributed to aggregate,
sectoral and labour supply shocks. Given the nature of reform one might expect sectoral shocks to I-  3
larger than normal effects on both demand (unemployment)  and supply sides (vacancies)  of the labour
market 29.  Further, we might expect the labour supply shocks to be non-trivial, given the ex ante high
participation rates.  This might be offset if a decline in real incomes - hence substitution effect -
dominates.  At this stage, we lack sufficient information  to pin down the extent of exit from the labour
force.
Fig.20 plots the path of unemployment  over several measures  for the latter part of 1991  and 1992
30. Using  the most inclusive - the broad - measure we observe more than doubling of registered job
searchers and the unemployment  rate for this measure between December 1991 and November 1992.
After initially sharp monthly acceleradon, we nodce some deceleration  in the rate of increase after May
1992 and particularly in the fourth quarter.  This is true for all three measures of unemployment,
including  benefits recipients. It seems likely that the deceleration  was associated  with the increased  flows
of credit to the firm sector in the third and fourth quarters allowing firms to retain workers, even on
reduced wages.
Data on the regional distribution  of unemployment  (Appendix  Table 2) shows that there is still
little dispersion in unemployment  rates by region  and we observe relatively  little dispersion  in the growth
rates of unemployment  across regions.  This may point to a fairly widespread  and apparently common
n The  data on unemployment  have  been  provided  by the Russian  Federal  Employment  Service.
"' At least relative  to North America  where aggregate  activity  shocks  have generaUy  been found  to shift
unemployment  and vacancy  rates  the most. See Blancha-d  and Diamond  (1989).
30  The  broad  measure  comprises  aU  jobseekers  registered  at a Labour  Office.  Those  recently  dismissed  and still
getting  severance  pay are put in this pool. The  narrow  measure  includes  all active  job searchers  who  cannot  be
matched  with  employment  by the Labour  Office. Benefits  recipients  have  to have  at least  a year's  work  history  and
be acdvely  searching  for work. In most  cases,  benefits  eligibility  ceases  after  one year.Flig 20  34. -
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Russia: Mass Layoffs to  Narrow Unemploy
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Russia: Unemployment inflow and outflow
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process in the generation  of unemployment  across regions, albeit at low frequencies  31.
With respect to inflows  to unemployment  we can pick out transitions induced  by mass lay-offs
in the firm sector.  This provides a very crude proxy for measuring any apparcnt shake-out  associated
with some regime change and accelerated  employment  separations. Fig. 22 provides the ratio of those
laid-off to total (narrow) unemployment;  the share shifts upwards but not by huge magnitudes.  For
1992.Q4 where we have data on the origin of inflows to unemployment,  we find a stable 30% share
originating  from mass layoffs. Further  - with the exception  of the Central Region,  comprising  Moscow,
where we find a disproportionately  high level of layoffs  - regional  data show such separations  to be fairly
uniformly  distributed with surprisingly  little dispersion  in the changes. This again points to a common
response function  and path across regions.
Information regarding the composition of the unemployed and their respective durations is
fragmentary.  First,  there  are already signs of protracted durations in  areas of  relatively high
unemployment.  As of January 1993,  nearly 11% of unemployed  were in a current spell  exceeding  a year.
The second striling feature is the weight  of females  in total unemployment  and its continuous  distribution
over respective durations of unemployment. At least 70% of the unemployed  and over 75% of those
receiving benefits were women on 1 July 19.  This share has subsequently  declined  but not by large
magnitudes. The table also indicates a significant  share of youth unempleyment. Around 10% of the
unemployed indeed lack any work experience  and are new entrants to the labour force.
Outflows from unemployment show surprising stability through  1992.  For  those leaving
unemployment  to jobs we observe little change in absolute numbers from February 1992 onwards and
in the ratio of job finds to total outflows but an obvious fall in the ratio of job finds to the stock of
unemployed  (Fig.23).  This appears  to tally with the available  economy-wide  data on hires that indicates
a continuing  high volume of hiring in the economy  through 1992. The fact that a consistent  40% of the
monthly  outflows  from unempicyment  are reported  as finding  jobs is itself  reasonably  striking  in a context
of the large cumulative  output  declines and widespread  reductions  in capacity. Further, roughly 85% of
total job finds in i992 were in  state firms; reinforcing the view that much of the movement  in and out
of unemployment  is between  state firms in localized  labour markets. Outflows  to jobs in collectives  and
3' We can  isolate  pockets  of relatively  high unemployment  - Yaroslav  oblast  in the Centre  region  and  parts  of
Northern  Caucasus,  for  example.  But  at present  we lack  sufficient  information  to pick  up  the deteminants  of local
unemployment.Russia  - 38-
private entities  monitored  by the Labour  Oftices still account  for only 15% of total outflows  to jobs, but
with considerable regional variation.  As  regards the efficiency of job  finds,  for  those leaving
unemployment  in the course of 1992, 80% did so after an unemployment  spell of less than 4 months.
Data for 1992.3Q  indicate  that over 30% of those who found a job did so within  ten days of registering
as unemployed.
Several  points can be made with regard to the path of vacancies. In the first place, we observe
a clear and sharp rise in posted vacancies  until September  1991. Thereafter, vacancies  fall significantly.
Posted labour demand by fimns at the labour office (a more reliable measure than vacancies) fell by
around 50% between January and  November 1992 32.  As Figure 20 shows, unemployment and
vacancies move in opposite directions.  This contrasts, say, with Poland in 1990 and  1991.  There,
vacancies  initially increased  and then decelerated  rather gradually  even as the unemployment  rate shifted
up over eight percentage  points, suggesting  the presence  of mismatch  and mobility  constraints. But for
Russia, there appears to be clear negative correlation between regional unemployment  rates and the
vacancy  to unemployed  ratio as well as considerable  convergence  in the changes  for regional vacancies.
These features suggest, at first approximation,  the process to have been dominated  by aggregate-type
shocks and that reallocation  effects  have as yet been weaker. Of course, we are unable presently to get
a proper handle on durations and hence on separating out not only the weight of changes in average
duration on unemployment  but also in determining  the effectiveness  of job  search behaviour by the
unemployed. But an obvious assumption  would be that a reduction  in search  effectiveness  would leave
vacancies  broadly unchanged  even as unemployment  rises.  By contrast, we currently  observe an inverse
movement  of unemployment  and vacancies.
The rapid expansion  in the numbers  eligible  for benefits  can primarily  be explained  by the lagged
feed-through  of unemployed  after exhaustion  of severance pay arrangements  and the declining share of
new entrants and other non-eligible  benefits  categories. It also raises  the issue  of financing  these  benefits.
The replacement  ratio has averaged 57% of the previous year's wage over the eligible year of benefits
payment.  At first inspection,  this ratio seems high; most OECD  countries have similar ratios for gross
benefits to gross wages. But several caveats are in order.  First, benefits  are not indexed  and with high
32 We  should  note  that most  ( >85%)  of these  posted  vacancies  are  for manual  workers,  reflecting  the  historical
bias in the composition  of labour  demand  of Russian  firms.Russia  - 39 -
inflation  most benefits  payments  collapse  to the minimum  level. Second,  given  the fact that non-cash
benefits  comprise  around  40% of average  labour  income,  inclusion  of such  benefits  adially lowers  the
effective  replacement  ratio.
7: InterpretIg  Wage and Employment  BDavl_or
The  story  of the last fifteen  months  is  thus  of an acceleration  in the rate  of deeline  of output  with
lmuited  unemployment  consequences.  Productivity  has fallen  sharply  while  wages  show  recent  signs  of
some  resurgence  after  the sharp  cut of January  1992. There  is no apparent  association  between  the rate
of change  in wages  and  the  unemployment  level. But  several  factors  have  to be considered.  First, labour
mobility  has remained  limited  because  of institutional  constraints  (the  propiska  system)  and  shortages  in
housing  markets. Statistics  are hard  to come  by but  the net urban  migration  rate  was  a third  of Westen
European  rates  in the 1980s  and  it appears  that  internal  migration  has  declined  further  in recent  years  ".
This makes  the use of regional  data  particularly  interesting;  in effect  one  can count  regions  or oblasts  as
distinct  and segmented  labour  markets. Second,  a possibly  better  measure  of abour  market  conditions
would  be combining  marginal  employment  (see  Section  4.1) with  the measure  of jobseekers.
Fig.25  relates  this  augmented  measure  of slack  to the  change  in nominal  wages  for the 77 oblasts
or republics. While  not fully  compelling,  we do observe  a weak  inverse  association  in our plot of the
oblast-level  data. Higher  levels  of slack  are associated  with  lower  changes  to wages.  Further,  classifying
oblasts  in terms  of their open  unemployment  levels,  we observe  a relatively  slower  growth  in wages  in
areas of high (>2%) unemployment  relative  to low  (<1%) unemployment  oblast (figs. 26-27). In
addition,  it is interesting  to note  that  oblasts  with  low  unemployment  levels  acualiy  have  hier  marginal
employment  rates, suggesting  that we are likely  observing  a common  process where  te  measure  of
jobseekers  can partly  be explained  by different  oblast  level  tolerance  for open  unmoyment  and  where
a fairly conunon  underlying  process  is at work.  The dispersion  in augment  employment rates
remains  rather low.
Aggregate  and  survey  data  come  together  in emphasizing  the  domina  of employment  stability
in  firms' decision making.  This view needs qualification  in one important  respect; firms have
systematically  discriminated  against  clerical  or administrative  staff,  primaly fmes.  The  clear  objective
has been  to hold  employment  of production  and  skilled  workers  consta.  This  also  explains  the presence
of an active  hiring  programme  as firms  replace  such  workers.
33  See  discussion  in Wodd  Bank  (1993).Fig  26  -40
Unemployment/wage inflation, Aug. 1992
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Wage setting, though clearly reflecting the interests of insider members, appears still to be
dominated by administratively  set decisions rather than widespread recourse to bargaining between
managers and workers.  Our survey, for example, indicated  that in only 17% of cases did wage setting
arise from an explicit bargaining  procedure and this was concentrated  in the non-state  firms.  Similarly,
despite emerging pressures for wage indexation and some preliminary steps to  associate minimum
pensions  and wages changes  to inflation  in an ex post scheme, indexation  is as yet not at all widespread.
Aside from non-trivial adjustment  lags to wages and institutional  constraints  arising from the banking
system 34,  wage settlements  in Russian firms have been primarily govemed by current revenue flows.
Firms in our survey, for example, ir,dicated  that exogenous restraints on wages and taxation were
dominated by current revenues in determining the firm-specific wage path.  This has given rise to
significant within-quarter fluctuations  originating  not only from normal movements in firm financial
variables  but also from extemally derived factors, such as the cash constraint  of the first half of 1992  and
the timing of budget or Central Bank transfers and credit decisions. This may account for some of the
erratic movement in wages over the year and, in particular, the relative wage restraint of the first half
of 1992.
The ability to satisfy current wage claims, holding  employment  broadly constant, has varied by
type of firm.  For consumer  goods producers, the first half of 1992  contained  a major negative  demand
shock from households. Real monetary balances and wages fell unambiguously  and by large apparent
magnitudes  and we observe a very sharp contraction  in retail sales.  As government spending  was held
relatively in check over this period, we may also observe a contraction  in government purchases.  For
non-consumer goods firms, the key issue would have been the ability to shift into cash sales, say,
ircuitously by barter deals or by direct export contracts.  Given the frictions associated with inter-
republican  trade we can assume that this was not invariably  an easy option, while domestic barter deals
would ultimately be subject to similar negative household demand effects.  The picture is obviously
complicated  once one introduces quantity constraints on production - as through the inavailability  of
inputs - or of restrictions on financing production through non-cash rubles.  The financial system
evidently amplified  the negative  shocks to household  demand. Once the distinction  over cash and non-
4Large  firms  with substantial  payrolls  remain  partly  liquidity  constrained  by limits  on withdrawals  imposed
by the  banking  systemRussia  - 42  -
cash rubles  was almost  completely  collpsed " and the technical  constraint  on cash was broken  in mid-
1992,  the mmbebhip rule could  drive  wages  more  rapidly  and we do indeed  observe  more  wage  drift
in the second  half of the year.
The  broad  and  necessarily  tentative  conclusion  tbat  we derive  is that  the  dominant  featue of both
firm  and  government  policy  has been  employment  stabUity  for core  firm  membership'  Wages  have  been
set  consistent  with  this  rule on a quasi-sharing  basis;  hence  the surprisingly  small  shifts  in relative  wages
in state firms.  The wage path has prhnarily  been a function  of current revenues  plus transfers  or
subsidies.  The movements  of output  and  product  prices  suggest  that  some  firms  have  worked  primarily
on adjusting  prices sanctioning  current  nominal  claims  and stable  employment. Where  the shock to
current  revenues  has been  more  extrem, the bulk  of firms  have  chosen  to place  staff  on reduced  hours
or involuntary  leave  rater  than  outright  separation.
6: Caduue
The last fifteen  months  hav  seen a failure  to stabilize  the Russian  economy  alongside  the
beginning  of structural  change. The overal balance  sheet, though  mixed,  indicates  that a return to
centralized  controls  remains  almost  impossible. Yet, the decentralization  that has occurred  to date
contains  many undesinable  featues.  In particular,  the greater autonomy  of firms  has facilitated  the
exploitation  of market  power  while  fahlig to dampen  the demand  for easy credits  from the budget  or
banking  system. For the most  pat,  these  demands  have  been  satisfied  enabling  firms  to meet current
wage  claims  and, to a lesser  degree,  sustain  output  levels. Buoyant  nominal  profits  in significant  parts
of the firm  sector  can  be traced  either  to pricing  behaviour  derived  from  market  power  or from  transfers
or subsidies  channeled  throu  the fiscal  or monetary  system. In turn, this has artificially  sustained  the
revenue  side of the government  accounts.
Flows  to unmployment  decelerated  over  the course  of 1992,  though  evidence  on the importance
of marginal  employment,  indicates  that the underlying  pass-through  into open unemployment  will be
large. By the third quarter  of 1992,  this augmnted unemployment  rate approached  4% of the labour
force.  Even  so, we observe  non-rivial  outdlows  friom  unemployment  to jobs and in some  regions  -
though  with  considerable  dispersion  - to jobs in the private  or collective  sector. But  important  to note
is the fact that  at the level  of Russia,  outflows  to state  sector  jobs dominate  massively. This confirms
the picture  we pick  up from  survey  evidence;  that  the  is considerable  turnover  in the state sector  and
U Firms  have  shid  whever possble  into  cash  transactions,  eidter  dirtcdy  or through  the  banking  system.Russia  - 43
a resilient  level  of hiring. Much  of the churning  occuring through  localized  labour  markets  appears  to
be through  voluntary  separations  and transitions  over jobs.  Net changes  to employment  have been
obviously  limited  as a result  and  Irgely concentaed  on ancillary  or clerical  staff.  We discern  some  sort
of core  or membership  rule  dominatng  Russian  firms' decisions.  It would  be dangerous  to assume  that
this strategy  will  be mantained.  We could  interpret  it as a holding  strategy  by firms  in a complex  game
that they have  been  playing  with  goverment.  A lack  of a credible  reform  programme  has obviously
weakened  any  impulse  to large-scale  resruct  at firm  level. Wages  have  been  more  volatile  and  have
had greater  regional  dispersion.  We do nt  observe  large  consistent  shifts  to relative  wages  that  could
be predicted. Rather,  the wage  path has probably  been governed  by current  revenue  streams  and
additional  transfers  and  then  set  consistent  with  the  stable  employment  rule.  The  path  of wages  over 1992
is clearly  strongly  associated  with  changes  in the monetary  and  fiscal  stance  and  with  allied  institutional
features.Russia  - 44
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Job  findings  by:
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:  :  (property  form of  ent.)  :------------------------------------------------------
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:  :enter-  :lectif :enter- :Const- :ture  *  ::vities :-----------------  I :  :prises  :enterpr.:prises  :ruction  :  :  ::  :workers  :cleric.  I
Russia  724659  609119  102256  13284  295348  57431  151856  220024  486897  177010
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nRegional  Unemployment  Rates  APPENDIX  TABLE  2
Volgo-  Central PovolzhskNothern  Western Eastern Far RUSSIA  North  NorthWestCenter Viatsky Chernozem  Caucasis  Ural  Syberia Syberia East  Kaliningr 92.1  0.74  1.26  0.66  0.70  0.60  0.71  0.77  0.74  0.69  0.72  0.74  0.76  0.92 92.2  0.84  1.34  0.74  0.83  0.69  0.87  0.87  0.84  0.79  0.82  0.83  0.82  1.00 92.3  0.94  1.52  0.87  0.93  0.86  1.04  0.94  0.94  0.75  0.96  0.89  0.93  1.17 92.4  1.05  1.65  0.99  1.09  0.95  1.15  0.97  0.99  0.86  1.12  1.02  1.07  1.42 92.5  1.12  1.70  1.12  1.16  1.01  1.21  1.04  1.09  0.94  1.16  1.07  1.13  1.57 92.6  1.18  1.73  1.30  1.23  1.08  1.28  1.06  1.16  0.92  1.27  1.06  1.18  1.72 92.7  1.28  1.87  1.45  1.33  1.20  1.36  1.12  1.24  1.00  1.37  1.12  1.25  1.75 92.8  1.37  2.01  1.55  1.43  1.35  1.41  1.18  1.36  1.07  1.46  1.20  1.32  1.93 92.9  1.39  2.18  1.63  1.51  1.48  1.30  1.18  1.41  1.14  1.29  1.14  1.33  2.13 92.10  1.48  2.39  1.77  1.59  1.65  1.33  1.25  1.45  1.25  1.39  1.23  1.38  .2.32 92.11  1.53  2.49  1.90  1.60  1.82  1.37  1.30  1.47  1.28  1.47  1.17  1.40  2.42
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